A intenção deste artigo é pôr em evidência a problemática do conhecimento em Delfim Santos, articulando conhecimento, realidade e verdade. Procura-se mostrar que há no pensamento deste autor uma reflexão gnosiológica que implica a consideração de “regiões da realidade”, que possuem, simultaneamente um alcance gnosiológico e ontológico.

Este texto tem como intenção apresentar uma reflexão acerca da dimensão existencial presente na obra de Vergílio Ferreira. Nesse sentido, centrar-me-ei em duas obras consideradas paradigmáticas quanto à intenção esboçada. O romance Aparição, dado que este estilo literário se presta bem a este modo de expressar a dinâmica da existência, pela noção de manifestação, e o ensaio Invocação ao Meu Corpo, pela problemática existencial da corporeidade que aí apresenta. Faremos, portanto, uma leitura existencial destas duas obras, enquadrando-as nas filosofias da (...) existência. (shrink)

Uma das abordagens que estuda o construto da motivação é a teoria da autodeterminação, que discrimina diferentes estilos motivacionais: desmotivação, motivação extrínseca e motivação intrínseca. Este estudoobjetivou identificar motivações de acadêmicos de um curso de Educação Física do estado São Paulo, Brasil, para participarem de uma capacitação em natação para pessoas com deficiência físicas, bem como a motivação para atuação como tutores desse mesmo grupo. Trata-se de um estudo qualitativo realizado por meio de entrevistas semiestruturadas. Participaram 20 acadêmicos do curso (...) de Educação Física,divididos em: capacitação teórica – CT e capacitação teórica associada a tutoria em natação adaptada-CTP. Após análise, as seguintes categorias e subcategorias foram estabelecidas: motivação extrínseca (objetivos ou ganhos futuros; decorrente de fatores externos e vinculada à recompensa ou punição) e desmotivação (sentimentos e percepções). Conclui-se que os principais fatores que motivaram os acadêmicos estiveram vinculados à motivação extrínseca. (shrink)

Neste artigo discute-se as induções e tensionamentos gerados pelo Sistema de avaliação e fomento da CAPES nos processos de produção do conhecimento dos Programas de Pós-graduação em Teologia. Problematiza-se a influência dos critérios de avaliação da CAPES na produção/veiculação do conhecimento no campo epistemológico da Teologia, tendo como aporte teórico o conceito de “campo” de Bourdieu. Constata-se que o campo de conhecimento teológico - que na sua origem e essência trata da fé e do mundo transcendente - gradativamente assume um (...) lugar no campo científico, na busca do reconhecimento/credenciamento e do protagonismo no ranking dos Programas de Pós-graduação com notas máximas na avaliação da CAPES. Para a análise, realizou-se pesquisa junto aos seis PPGT do país existentes em 2011 e um estudo de caso múltiplo em três desses Programas com conceitos iguais ou superiores a cinco e com cursos de mestrado e doutorado reconhecidos pelas suas igrejas – católica ou protestante –, em período anterior à inserção na CAPES. A coleta de dados teve como base os seguintes documentos: fichas de avaliação dos Programas emitidas pela Capes, proposta dos PPGT em análise, produção docente e discente veiculada nos currículos lattes, análise das publicações nas revistas científicas dos Programas pesquisados, além de entrevistas com 22 professores dos PPGTs, que analisam os ganhos, perdas e embates decorrentes desse processo de reconhecimento. Os resultados da pesquisa apontam que a inserção no Sistema de avaliação e fomento exigiu dos Programas mudanças, estruturais e epistemológicas, tais como: alterações nas linhas de pesquisa, nas temáticas das teses e dissertações, bem como transformações nos tempos e meios de veiculação da produção docente. Palavras-chave: Programas de Pós-Graduação em Teologia. Campo de conhecimento. Capes. Avaliação stricto sensu. (shrink)

This article considers aspects of a development aid that provides medical support to strengthen pediatric orthopedics in Rwanda. We present part of the Afriquia foundation work, a nonprofit foundation from Poland involved in supporting the medical sector in Rwanda as a sign of global solidarity and the human right to health. The main foundation's activity is the treatment of orthopedic problems among Rwandan citizens. We present a case study of two children under the care of the Afiquia foundation. 11‐year‐old Seraphine (...) treated due to the consequences of right tibia osteomyelitis and 11‐year‐old Lavi suffering from osteogenesis imperfecta. Both children were treated surgically in Poland due to Rwanda's lack of treatment possibilities. After the applied treatment, Seraphine walks correctly without crutches and can attend school and thrive among her peers. Lavi has not sustained any fragility fracture since the surgery in Poland. He is healthy and constantly ongoing his rehabilitation including gait training. The described cases initiated development aid in Rwanda, supplying hospitals with orthopedic implants and training medical staff. The growing number of humanitarian crises across the globe and the people affected requires increasing organizations involved in providing relief. The emphasis should be on global education, aiming to make the recipients reflect and prepare them to face humanitarian crises. (shrink)

In this paper I propose a way of characterizing human agency in terms of the concept of a two‐way power. I outline this conception of agency, defend it against some objections, and briefly indicate how it relates to free agency and to moral praise‐ and blameworthiness.

In the past thirty years or so, the doctrine that actions are events has become an essential, and sometimes unargued, part of the received view in the philosophy of action, despite the efforts of a few philosophers to undermine the consensus. For example, the entry for Agency in a recently published reference guide to the philosophy of mind begins with the following sentence: A central task in the philosophy of action is that of spelling out the differences between events in (...) general and those events that fall squarely into the category of human action. There is no consensus about what events are. But it is generally agreed that, whatever events may prove to be, actions are a species or a class of events. We believe that the received view is mistaken: actions are not events. We concede that for most purposes, the kind of categorial refinement which is involved in either affirming or denying that actions are events is frankly otiose. Our common idiom does not stress the difference between actions and events, at least not in general terms, because it has no need to. Perhaps it sounds a little odd to say that some events are performed; but if we balked at describing, say, the abdication of Edward VIII as one of the politically significant events in Britain in 1936, it could not be for metaphysical reasons. And since actions, like events, are datable — though often, as we shall see, only imprecisely — actions are said to take place and to occur. But an important class of actions consist in moving something; indeed, according to many philosophers, every action consists in moving something. And when we consider actions of this sort from a theoretical point of view it becomes imperative to distinguish between actions and events. Or so we shall argue. (shrink)

Creativity has often been declared, especially by philosophers, as the last frontier of science. The assumption is that it will defy explanation forever. I will defend two claims in order to oppose this assumption and to demystify creativity: (1) the perspective that creativity cannot be explained wrongly identifies creativity with what I shall call metaphysical freedom; (2) the Darwinian approach to creativity, a prominent naturalistic account of creativity, fails to give an explanation of creativity, because it confuses conceptual issues with (...) explanation. I will close with some remarks on the status and differences in some explanations available in contemporary cognitive science. (shrink)

A Philosophy to Live By highlights Murdoch's distinctive conception of philosophy as a spiritual or existential practice and enlists the resources of her thought to explore a wide range of thinkers and debates at the intersections of moral philosophy, religion, art, and politics.

During the postpartum period, the paternal brain suffers extensive and complex neurobiological alterations, through the experience of father–infant interactions. Although the impact of such experience in the mother has been increasingly studied over the past years, less is known about the neurobiological correlates of fatherhood—that is, the alterations in the brain and other physiological systems associated with the experience of fatherhood. With the present study, we aimed to perform a scoping review of the available literature on the genetic, neuroendocrine, and (...) brain correlates of fatherhood and identify the main gaps in the current knowledge. PubMed, Scopus, and Web of Science electronic databases were searched for eligible studies on paternal neuroplasticity during the postpartum period, over the past 15 years. Reference lists of relevant key studies and reviews were also hand-searched. The research team independently screened the identified studies based on the established inclusion criteria. Extracted data were analyzed using tables and descriptive synthesis. Among the 29 studies that met our inclusion criteria, the vast majority pertained to neuroendocrine correlates of fatherhood, followed by brain activity or connectivity, association studies of candidate genes, and brain structure correlates. Collectively, studies published during the past 15 years suggest the existence of significant endocrine and neurofunctional alterations as a result of fatherhood, as well as preliminary evidence of genetic variability accounting for individual differences during the postpartum period in fathers. No studies were so far published evaluating epigenetic mechanisms associated with the paternal brain, something that was also the focus of the current review. We highlight the need for further research that examines neuroplasticity during the experience of fatherhood and that considers both the interplay between hormones and simultaneous assessment of the different biomarkers ; data collection protocols and assessment times should also be refined. (shrink)

Thus one should define, in a double way, name and form in all phenomena of the three realms. …In this essay, we want to bring together two issues for their mutual illumination: the particular use of that hoary Indian dyad, "nāma-rūpa," literally, "name-and-form," by Buddhaghosa, the influential fifth-century Theravāda writer, to organize the categories of the abhidhamma, the canonical classification of phenomenal factors and their formulaic ordering;1 and an interpretation of phenomenology as a methodology. We argue that Buddhaghosa does not (...) use abhidhamma as a reductive ontological division of the human being into mind and body, but rather as the contemplative structuring of human phenomenology.... (shrink)

Throughout his long intellectual life, Leibniz penned his reflections on Christian theology, yet this wealth of material has never been systematically gathered or studied. This book addresses an important and central aspect of these neglected materials—Leibniz’s writings on two mysteries central to Christian thought, the Trinity and the Incarnation. -/- From Antognazza’s study emerges a portrait of a thinker surprisingly receptive to traditional Christian theology and profoundly committed to defending the legitimacy of truths beyond the full grasp of human reason. (...) This view of Leibniz differs strikingly from traditional perceptions of the philosopher as a “hard” rationalist and quasi-deist. Antognazza also sets Leibniz’s writings in the context of the important theological controversies of his day. (shrink)

Contempt and disgust share a number of features which distinguish them from other hostile emotions: they both present two distinct facets—a nonmoral facet and a moral one; they both imply a negative evaluation of the dispositional kind as well as disrespect towards the target of the feeling; and they trigger avoidance and exclusion action tendencies. However, while sharing a common core, contempt and disgust are in our view distinct emotions, qualified by different cognitive-motivational features. Contempt is felt exclusively towards human (...) targets, and implies sense of superiority over them, pessimistic feelings about their possibility of betterment, detachment from them, and avoidance driven by detachment; whereas disgust can be directed at a wide range of possible targets, and implies contamination sensitivity, fear of contamination, and fear-driven avoidance. The differences between contempt and disgust are related to the different kinds of standard against which the target is evaluated, and the different kinds of disrespect engendered by the negative evaluation. (shrink)

Although no scholarly consensus exists on the issue, the claim that a substantive reconfiguration of the Internet has occurred in the beginning of the 2000s has settled firmly in public common sense. The label tentatively chosen for the new turn in the medium’s evolution is Web 2.0. The developments constituting this turn have been contemplated from different perspectives in technical and business publications (O’Reilly 2005), in treatises on convergence or participatory culture (Jenkins 2006; Jenkins et al. 2009), and could be (...) usefully interrogated by means of political economy concepts such as the social factory and free labor (Terranova 2004). Marked, or rather symbolically constructed, by these discursive pickets lies a field of practice that the members of the participatory culture, the produsers (Bruns 2008) of open journalism, blogs, social networking sites and other characteristic Web 2.0 applications inhabit and animate with their everyday thought, decision making and action. This paper undertakes a theoretical exploration of the user practices emerging and consolidating around the new technological and organizational models making up Web 2.0. It is informed by a qualitative study of bloggers and Facebook users conducted through focus group methodology, although the concrete empirical data are not presented here. Rather, the analysis employs the concept of technologies of the self by Foucault (1988) as a heuristic device in order to situate Web 2.0 use, first, in a long history of culturally evolved forms of self-constitution and, second, in a complex matrix of relationships with other types of technologies, namely, those of production, sign systems and power. This conceptual choice, we argue, furnishes a study of Web 2.0 use, which holds in balance its liberatory potential and its susceptibility to new forms of domination, rationalization and commodification. (shrink)

Esta propuesta se inscribe en el marco de análisis y comprensión de los procesos de subjetivación contemporáneos como maneras de imponer una esencia a una existencia. Puesto que hemos sido edificadas con las imágenes de otros, las mujeres hemos debido construirnos cada una con ellas. Siendo muy diversos los desenlaces de esta construcción, somos sin embargo parecidas al compartir una particular manera de vínculo: la experiencia que denomino del deseo de ser. Estando siempre sin hacer, somos siempre siendo y, aunque (...) dadas ya por hechas, cada mujer es el resultado de un tremendo esfuerzo y paciencia cuya resolución permite vivir. (shrink)

This paper addresses whether the often-bemoaned loss of unity of knowledge about humans, which results from the disciplinary fragmentation of science, is something to be overcome. The fragmentation of being human rests on a couple of distinctions, such as the nature-culture divide. Since antiquity the distinction between nature (roughly, what we inherit biologically) and culture (roughly, what is acquired by social interaction) has been a commonplace in science and society. Recently, the nature/culture divide has come under attack in various ways, (...) in philosophy as well as in cultural anthropology. Regarding the latter, for instance, the divide was quintessential in its beginnings as an academic dis-cipline, when Alfred L. Kroeber, one of the first professional anthropologists in the US, rallied for (what I call) the right to ignore—in his case, human nature—by adopting a separationist epistemic stance. A separationist stance will be understood as an epistemic research heuristic that defends the right to ignore a specif-ic phenomenon (e.g., human nature) or a specific causal factor in an explanation typical for a disciplinary field. I will use Kroeber’s case as an example for making a general point against a bias towards integration (synthesis bias, as I call it) that is exemplified, for instance, by defenders of evolutionary psychology. I will claim that, in principle, a separationist stance is as good as an integrationist stance since both can be equally fruitful. With this argument from fruitful sepa-ration in place, not just the separationist stance but also the nature/culture di-vide can be defended against its critics. (shrink)

This book argues that we can find the resources to build a public perspective if we make two commitments: to respect people as autonomous agents and to endorse a shared ethics of beliefs.

Natural languages exhibit a great variety of grammatical paradigms. For instance, in English verbs are grammatically marked for tense, whereas in the tenseless Eskimo-Aleut language Kalaallisut they are marked for illocutionary mood. Although time is a universal dimension of the human experience and speaking is part of that experience, some languages encode reference to time without any grammatical tense morphology, or reference to speech acts without any illocutionary mood morphology. Nevertheless, different grammatical systems are semantically parallel in certain respects. Specifically, (...) I propose that English tenses form a temporal centering system, which monitors and updates topic times, whereas Kalaallisut moods form a modal centering system, which monitors and updates modal discourse referents. To formalize these centering parallels I define a dynamic logic that represents not only changing information but also changing focus of attention in discourse (Update with Centering, formalizing Grosz et al 1995). Different languages can be translated into this typed logic by directly compositional universal rules of Combinatory Categorial Grammar (CCG) The resulting centering theory of tense and illocutionary mood draws semantic parallels across different grammatical systems. The centering generalizations span the extremes of the typological spectrum, so they are likely to be universal. In addition, the theory accounts for the translation equivalence of tense and illocutionary mood in a given utterance context. Following Stalnaker (1978) I assume that the very act of speaking up has a ‘commonplace effect’ on the context. It focuses attention on the speech act and thereby introduces default modal and temporal topics. These universal defaults complement language-specific grammars, e.g. English tenses and Kalaallisut moods. In a given utterance context the universal discourse-initial defaults plus language-specific grammatical marking may add up to the same truth conditions.. (shrink)

This paper has two aims. First, to bring together the models of temporal phenomenology on offer and to present these using a consistent set of distinctions and terminologies. Second, to examine the methodologies currently practiced in the development of these models. To that end we present an abstract characterisation in which we catalogue all extant models. We then argue that neither of the two extreme methodologies currently discussed is suitable to the task of developing a model of temporal phenomenology. An (...) entirely top-down methodology is largely insensitive to empirical findings, while one that is entirely bottom-up is insensitive to both introspective evidence and more general philosophical considerations. We recommend a methodology that falls between these two extremes. (shrink)

This article is an extended promenade strolling along the winding roads of identity, equality, nameability and completeness, looking for places where they converge. We have distinguished between identity and equality; the first is a binary relation between objects while the second is a symbolic relation between terms. Owing to the central role the notion of identity plays in logic, you can be interested either in how to define it using other logical concepts or in the opposite scheme. In the first (...) case, one investigates what kind of logic is required. In the second case, one is interested in the definition of the other logical concepts in terms of the identity relation, using also abstraction. The present paper investigates whether identity can be introduced by definition arriving to the conclusion that only in full higher-order logic a reliable definition of identity is possible. However, the definition needs the standard semantics and we know that with this semantics completeness is lost. We have also studied the relationship of equality with comprehension and extensionality and pointed out the relevant role played by these two axioms in Henkin’s completeness method. We finish our paper with a section devoted to general semantics, where the role played by the nameable hierarchy of types is the key in Henkin’s completeness method. (shrink)

It is commonly accepted that people can, and regularly do, deceive themselves. Yet closer examination reveals a set of conceptual puzzles that make self-deception difficult to explain. Applying the conditions for other-deception to self-deception generates what are known as the ‘paradoxes’ of belief and intention. Simply put, the central problem is how it is possible for me to believe one thing, and yet intentionally cause myself to simultaneously believe its contradiction. There are two general approaches taken by philosophers to account (...) for these puzzles about the self-deceptive state and the process of self-deception. ‘Partitioning’ strategies try to resolve the paradoxes by proposing that the mind is divided in some way that allows self-deception to occur. ‘Reformulation’ strategies suggest that the conditions we use to define self-deception should be modified so that the paradoxes do not arise at all. Both approaches are subject to criticism about the consequences of the strategies philosophers use, but recent cross-disciplinary analyses of self-deception may help shed light on the puzzles that underlie this phenomenon. (shrink)